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Abstract
The transition from state socialism to market socialism in China since 1978 led 
to a sense of disorientation and moral crisis in the Chinese population which by the 
mid-1990s the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attempted to correct. Specifically, 
the CCP Committee in the region of Guangdong responded by elaborating a new 
version of the teaching manual Three-Word Classic in order to meet the new social 
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circumstances with a body of specific moral rules based on Confucian philosophy 
and aimed at the Chinese younger generations. The Party’s chief goal was to rebuild 
the framework of moral behavior ousted by the rapid social changes of the 80s 
and 90s and which until the reform era was supplied by the official line of the 
CCP and the ideas nurtured during the Cultural Revolution. The New Three-Word 
Classic soon became widely popular in the country and allowed schools to teach 
their students a series of moral rules through the examples of historical figures and 
events which overall championed patriotism and diligence in learning but failed to 
address public spiritedness, essential in guiding emerging public life in China. 
Key-words: China, moral crisis, public morality, civil society, moral 
education.
Resumen
La transición del socialismo de estado al socialismo de mercado en China 
a partir de 1978 codujo a una sensación de desorientación y crisis moral en la 
población china que a mediados de la década de 1990 el Partido Comunista 
Chino (PCC) intentó corregir. Concretamente, el Comité del PCC de la región de 
Guangdong respondió elaborando una nueva versión del manual de enseñanza 
Clásico de las Tres Palabras para así responder a las nuevas circunstancias 
sociales con un conjunto de reglas morales específicas basadas en la filosofía de 
Confucio y dirigido a las generaciones chinas más jóvenes. El principal objetivo 
del Partido fue reconstruir el marco de comportamiento moral desbancado por los 
rápidos cambios sociales de los 80 y los 90 and que hasta la época de la reforma 
procedía de la línea oficial del PCC y las ideas surgidas durante la Revolución 
Cultural. El Nuevo Clásico de las Tres Palabras pronto se hizo enormemente 
popular en el país y permitió que las escuelas enseñaran a sus alumnos una serie 
de reglas morales a través de ejemplos de personajes y sucesos históricos que en 
su conjunto abogaban por el patriotismo y la diligencia en el aprendizaje, si bien 
no consiguió abordar la iniciativa pública, esencial para guiar la emergente vida 
pública en China.
Palabras-clave: China, crisis moral, moralidad pública, sociedad civil, 
educación moral.
Introduction
This paper discusses how Confucianism was used by a regional branch of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to deal with the moral crisis arising from 
the transition of state socialism to market socialism in China since 1978. The 
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paper first analyzes the origin of this moral crisis and how the CCP Committee 
in Guangdong responded to this crisis by publishing the New Three-Word 
Classic in 1995. The publication adopted many Confucian ideals and aimed at 
providing a vivid moral guidance in a drastically changing environment. Finally, 
the paper critically assesses the effectiveness of Confucianism, when used by 
the state as an ideology, in resolving the moral problems of contemporary 
Chinese society. 
The discussion is based on the findings from a sub-project of a study 
of Confucianism and modernity in Chinese societies (Cheung, Chan, Chan, 
King, Chiu & Chung 2006). The research was conducted in the summer of 
1998 in Guangzhou. The major author of the book, officials in the Propaganda 
Department of the Guangzhou Party Committee and a number of parents were 
interviewed. Content of the book and news reports on the publication and 
related issues from 1995 to 1998 in a local newspaper Yangcheng Wenbao were 
analyzed. Selection of Guangdong as a site for case study has a significant 
implication to China not because of its typicality, but because the region is the 
frontier of economic reform. The socio-economic restructuring in this region 
might shed lights on the future of China.
Moral Crisis and Its Roots
The sense of moral crisis in China emerged simultaneously with the 
introduction of economic reforms in late 1970s. In 1980, a letter, “The Path 
of Life is Getting Narrower”, sent by a young female worker to China’s Youth 
aroused enormous attention from the public. The letter expressed the worker’s 
deep sense of confusion after witnessing the huge discrepancy between the 
Party’s indoctrination and social reality. In response to her question about the 
meaning of life after disillusionment from the Cultural Revolution, more than 
40,000 letters, including one from the CCP chief ideologist, were sent to the 
magazine to discuss the issue. 
The moral crisis at this stage can be described as a form of disillusionment 
with socialism and legitimacy crisis of the CCP. Studies showed that many 
people questioned the validity of Marxism and adopted a pragmatic attitude 
toward the joining of the CCP (Rosen 1990:295). Young people regarded party 
membership as a ticket to career development and only a tiny minority believed 
in the Communist ideals or the spirit of “serving the people”. This moral crisis 
was further aggravated by drastic opening of China to market economy and 
international trade. The promotion of pragmatism and materialism by the state 
(Pye 1986), the rampant corruption caused by the dual existence of market and 
planned economies (Chan 2000 ), the deterioration of public order due to rapid 
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urbanization, and the emergence of new social and economic activities without 
established norms and regulations, led to a state of confusion and uneasiness. 
In this later stage, the moral crisis can be understood as a form of “social 
disorganization” (Rubington & Winberg 1989), i.e. a state of normlessness, 
cultural conflict or breakdown of rules due to dramatic social change. Simply 
put, people feel that they lack lucid moral guidance to lead their lives in the 
reform era.
The extent of this moral crisis cannot be accurately assessed due to the 
political sensitivity of the issue. Large scale value surveys are usually restricted 
in China when openly asking people’s value orientations in matters related to 
public domain. Without systematic data of this kind, it is difficult to judge 
whether the alleged moral crisis is a full-blown one or it is confined to certain 
areas in certain dimension of morality. At least, our study of laidoff workers in 
Guangzhou (Chan & Qiu 1999) shows that there is a revival of family values 
in China in terms of assisting family members to cope with financial hardship, 
indicating that the crisis may be less serious in the private arena. Another 
survey in Guangzhou shows that people highly valued “marriage and family” 
but ranked “fulfilling social responsibilities” as the least important value (Chan 
1996:281), indicating that the crisis may be more pressing in the public arena. 
The decay of public morality in contemporary China, in terms of growth 
of self-absorbed behaviors due to the loss of trust and respect for people and 
institutions beyond families, is the outcome of devastating cultural conflicts 
and institutional arrangements. The former refers to the promotion of Maoist 
extreme rituals of struggle (especially during the Cultural Revolution) that 
destroyed the synthesis of Confucianism with Marxism. The complete exclusion 
of personal and familial interests led to the glorification of strident dogmatism. 
The brutality of power struggle further revealed the hypocrisy of the supporters 
of the new socialist morality. The result was an explosion of pure moral zeal 
that ironically led to the demoralization of the society and the degradation of 
the moral character of some community leaders. Many in the population were 
left without any firm set of principles to believe in or structured rituals which 
may help them bring order to their lives (Madsan, 1984:23-25, 261-262; Whyte 
& Parish, 1984:324-325).
Chu and Ju (1993:283) also found that the Cultural Revolution is a unique 
factor in causing the decay of social trust when friends and family members 
betrayed each other. They also believe that the full-scale assault on the 
traditional Chinese values not only demoralized the generation in Mao’s era, but 
also disrupted the basic socialization process of the next generation: “Growing 
up in such a cultural vacuum, where traditional values no longer prevail and 
new values have yet to be established, may do more damage to young Chinese 
than the impact of value denunciation their parents had to endure…They have 
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no roots in traditional Chinese culture. They came of age at a time of anomic 
confusion, and therefore exhibit more skepticism and awareness of the evil in 
human nature” (1993:300).
Today, this generation faces a new episode of cultural conflict, as 
contradictory principles are promoted in “market socialism”. On the one hand, 
“developing production force” is proclaimed by the state as the primary national 
objective, getting rich is glorious, and market force is praised. When this market 
principle is pushed to the extreme, collective interest can be understood as the 
sum of individual happiness. On the other hand, the state still promotes socialist 
morality in terms of frugality, equality, serving the people, and sacrifice of 
individual interest for the sake of the collectivity. The tension of these moral 
principles has never been systematically dealt with as open and critical debates 
on the official ideology are discouraged, if not banned. At the same time, the 
state mechanically swaps from one principle to another catering for different 
political needs. In order to achieve economic growth, officials may adopt a 
pragmatic language encouraging consumerism and individual gratifications; 
when dealing with national security issue, the state may emphasize collectivity 
and harmony, and attack the individualistic tendency in Western capitalist and 
liberal-democratic societies. While the official ideology is self-contradictory 
and the society lacks a public sphere for constituting a social value system of 
its own, people lack a vivid moral framework in coping with the predicaments 
during the reform era.
The second origin of the problem lies at the institutional level. One of 
the most significant motivations for being responsible is the need “to belong 
somewhere”. If a person becomes a member of a community, and if this 
community is vital to one’s survival and/or well-being, one will be prompted 
to act in a way so that the consequences of one’s acts will not be harmful to the 
community, and one will accept the fact of one’s responsibility to this community 
(Hankiss, 1990). Erikson’s study also shows that the loss of community might 
lead to “a sense of cultural disorientation, a feeling of powerlessness, a dulled 
apathy and a generalized fear about the condition of the universe”(1976:258). 
To him, in the long run, morality is a form of community participation. Putnam 
(1993), in his landmarked study of civic communities in Italy, also argues that 
effective civic organizations are vital to the formation of “norms of reciprocity” 
and social trust among strangers. Without these organizations, people tend to 
free-ride and make transactions more costly in the arena beyond families.
In China, the destruction of the nascent civil society of the late 19th 
century (Strand 1990) by the CCP after 1949, unintentionally demoralized 
the people by depriving the community of participation. Natural communities 
and autonomous social organizations were replaced by the state-controlled 
rural collectives and the urban danwei system, particularly state or collective 
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enterprises providing employment and welfare protections to the workers. 
Public spaces, like the free press and teahouses where political discussion had 
been held freely in the late 19th century, were abandoned. This public sphere 
is crucial in creating a “socially constitutive” value system and expressing the 
encompassing collective identity of any given society (Frientzel-Zagorska, 
1990). Without this value system and collective identity, people either have to 
rely on an official moral framework or a private idiosyncratic understanding 
of reality. A “dual culture” then emerges: an official culture filled with bright 
euphemisms, silences, and platitudes such as those Havel describes, “a world of 
appearance, a mere ritual, a formalized language deprived of semantic contact 
with reality” (1985:32) and an unofficial culture that had its own knowledge 
of social problems. Bennett (1979) argues that when people face such dual 
realities, they are tempted to make one of two dissatisfying concessions to 
come to terms with the political world: either private understandings must be 
sacrificed for arbitrary public understandings, or public understandings must be 
rejected in favor of idiosyncratic interpretations. The former solution, to cope 
with a world that is not one’s own making, generally results in alienation, while 
the latter strategy very likely generates the problem of anomie (1979:130).
In Mao’s era, especially during the Cultural Revolution, people suffered 
from alienation, as they were repeatedly mobilized to participate in political 
struggles that otherwise they might not support. After a decade of ruthless 
crackdown on “class enemies” without clear definition, and the destruction 
of heritages without generating a more promising culture, what remained in 
society were fear and disillusion. By the end of the Cultural Revolution, many 
people felt fatigue of the state’s limited cultural repertoire and determined to 
stay away from the public arena. The liberalization during the reforms after 
1978 then permitted thousands of communities and millions of families the 
physical and moral space in which to express and preserve memories not of 
the state’s design (Davis 1989:95). Retreat to the private world of the family 
became a common antidote to the alienated public world. This resurgence 
of family provided an institutional base for the reconstitution of private 
morality, i.e. norms and values dictating personal and family relationships. The 
reconstitution of public morality, however, faces more obstacles when dealing 
with people and organizations beyond personal networks and families. People 
normally lack a genuine community where to develop trust and a socially 
constitutive value system as guidance. Instead, very often they resort to an 
individualistic self-absorbing approach that finally leads to a state of anomie. 
Thus, the root of demoralization, especially in the public arena, concerns both 
the cultural and institutional disorientation.
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Confucianism as a Solution?
The Chinese state is not unaware of the prevalent moral crisis during the 
reform era, though they may have their own interpretation and solution of the 
problem. One of the strategies was to promote “spiritual civilization” from time 
to time through campaigns and educational programs. While these campaigns 
aimed at raising moral standards of the people, the style remained orthodox and 
the substance lacked contemporary relevance. In a 1993 meeting on developing 
socialist spiritual civilization, the Propaganda Department of the Guangdong 
Party Committee proposed to publish a “New Three-Word Classic” (Xin San Zi 
Jing) as an innovative means to promote a new socialist morality in the era of 
market socialism. The book was finally published in Feb. 10, 1995. 
A major contributor to the new book explained to the author of this paper 
that the publication aimed at providing moral guidance to Chinese people under 
the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, and from a closed 
society to an open society. Many problems emerged in this transition, as old 
rules broke down while new ones were yet to establish. He did not believe that 
the problems could be solved by appealing to “authority” or by shouting hollow 
slogans as in the past. He admitted that socialism and the CCP had lost their 
legitimacy. On the contrary, he believed that many traditional values were still 
relevant today and could provide people with a moral framework necessary to 
lead a virtuous life. He understood that people were disgusted by indoctrination 
and coercion, and so he believed only through “consent and internalization” 
could new moral values be promoted. In order to reconstitute social order, he 
thought they first had to cultivate the moral tissue of the people. However, he 
told me that he had no intention whatsoever to promote Confucianism, but since 
many traditional values were rooted in Confucianism, he inevitably became an 
advocator of Confucian values.
As a matter of fact, the old Three-Word Classic was a popular handy 
text for people in traditional China to learn Confucian teachings. At first, the 
editors of the New Three-World Classic even adopted an ultimate Confucian 
ideal –“self-cultivation, regulating the family, ordering the state and bringing 
peace to the world”– as the theme of the book. However, later they found that 
as their targeted readers were youngsters, the third and fourth objectives of 
the Confucian life were too difficult to reach. They later changed the theme of 
the book to “educating the young people to be a good child in family, a good 
student in school and a good citizen in society”. In a press release published 
in the April 29, 1995 issue of Yangcheng Wenbao, the theme was further 
elaborated: “to love your country, you should first love your family and your 
hometown; to love the people, you should first love your parents, relatives 
and neighbors; to love science, you should first study diligently; to love labor, 
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you should first help do housework and charity; to love socialism, you should 
first learn a socialist, civilized mode of behaviors”. In a word, the New Classic 
attempted to transform those abstract moral objects such as country, people, 
labor and socialism into concrete entities and persons that one could develop 
a moral relationship with. They were also translating the political and public 
moral concern into private moral issues, which was not unlike the Confucian 
belief that what one did in the confines of one’s private home was politically 
significant, or the passage in the Book of Documents: “Simply by being a good 
son and friendly to his brothers a man can exert influence upon government!” 
(Tu 1998:12) Our informant made a metaphor of “asking children to jump and 
pick fruits from the tree”. They needed to jump up to a quite tall tree, which 
represens a challenge in moral development. But the tree should not be too tall 
to make the fruits unreachable; otherwise, any political ideals would be deemed 
too unreachable for the children today.
As the book was written by a group of liberal intellectuals with the auspice 
of the Guangdong Communist Party, it inevitably involved a complex process 
of negotiation and compromise. There were five consents reached during the 
elaboration of the book. The new manual should 1) promote traditional virtues 
and modern spirit at the same time; to emphasize patriotism and communist 
moral characters at the same time; 2) fit the psychological needs of the young 
generation and provide a hierarchy of moral challenges to these youngsters. 
3) promote some model figures of China, traditional and modern, to provide 
a sensational configuration of moral standards. 4) promote moral education 
through history, science and cultural knowledge; and 5) attract readers by 
including pictures in the text. Our informant described the writing process 
as quite liberal, with no “cardinal principles” imposed from above. Though 
some high-ranking officials acted as gatekeepers, some of their opinions were 
rejected by the authors as well. Even the idea of “communist moral characters” 
was introduced to ensure the “political correctness” of the publication: it was 
understood in the editorial board as nothing but moral virtues.
Public response to the publication was overwhelming. More than 40 
millions copies were sold (12 millions in Guangdong), mainly through the 
school system. Around 1 million copies were sold directly to the market through 
bookstores. Besides, instruction manuals and supplementary readings of the 
New Classic also circulated widely. A series of 30 talks explaining the New 
Classic were broadcast in radio; a music contest was held to create a melody 
for the text; and drama shows were staged to bring to life some stories found 
in the New Classic.
Our informant was impressed by the local response to one of the lectures 
he gave: “Around four thousand people came to listen to me. These parents sat 
quietly in an open space just to understand more about the New Three-Word 
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Classic. They were so attentive that not a single villager went to the bathroom. 
So far, I have given 109 lectures, and the responses from the people were like 
‘hunger and thirst’. As I worked too hard, my throat was so uncomfortable that 
I finally needed to seek medical help. Some doctors and patients recognized me 
and earnestly let me jump the line to be treated”.
Although the Guangdong authorities had issued a memorandum to support 
the circulation of the book, the promotion, sales, discussions and other related 
contests went beyond the top-down mobilization. Some schools encouraged 
their students to memorize the text of the New Classic though it was not 
officially included in their curriculums. Publishers in other provinces requested 
to re-print the New Classic themselves, as the 15 printers in Guangdong could 
not print it fast enough to meet the demand. The book was later selected as 
the Best Book of the Year in China. Top leaders Li Nanqing and Zhou Jiahua 
met the representatives from the editorial board to discuss the possibility of 
promoting the book nationwide.
Dilemma in the New Three-Word Classic
Although the New Classic attempted to transform abstract moral ideas 
into concrete moral guidelines and from political-moral concerns into private 
moral codes, content analysis of the text found that the book focused more on 
the promotion of patriotism, sense of history, and modernization than private 
moral guidelines. The book contains 105 sections, each section includes four 
sentences and each sentence is made up of three words. Following the main text, 
background information and interpretations of some idioms, historical events 
and legends, were provided. Since the book has gone through several editions, 
this study uses the first edition as the basis of analysis. Table 1 reports the 
distribution of the sections according to the themes summarized and translated 
by the author of this paper. Table 2 reports the distribution of sections according 
to the division of public and private morality.
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Public Morality
Patriotism
Promotion of patriotism is a major theme of the New Three-Word Classic. 
Very often, it is expressed through the spirit of “sacrifice for the country” 
illustrated by historical figures and events. In section 49, the story of Su Wu 
is told: Su was a Chinese ambassador to Mongolia during the Han Dynasty, 
exiled by the Mongolians to a noman’sland after he refused to desert his own 
country. The story of Wen Tianxiang is presented in section 37 in appreciation 
of his loyalty to the country. He was a chief official in southern Sung who killed 
himself for refusing to surrender during a foreign invasion. Another famous 
icon of loyalty, Qu Yuan, appears in section 71. The Opium War of 1840-42 and 
the looting and burning of Yuan Ming Yuan by the British and French armies 
in 1860 are presented in section 55 and 56 as a national shame. In connection 
with it, Fan Zhongyan’s idea of “to be first in worrying about the country’s 
problems and last in enjoying its pleasures”, which appears in section 50, can 
also be interpreted as an attempt to promote concern and consciousness for 
national interest.
Civic virtue/serving the people
In section 29, the book teaches the reader to abide by laws and have 
public morality, and in section 41, to take care of public goods. Section 44 
promotes the idea of environmental protection. In section 31, Premier Zhou 
Enlai is introduced as a model leader who spent his whole life helping the 
poor and those in need. Section 32 pinpoints military general Zhu Da’s 
equalitarian style of leadership. Revolutionary cadre Jiao Yulu is praised in 
section 34, as he insisted in working for the people while he was suffering 
from the pains of liver cancer. Surprisingly, the model of dedicated service to 
the people, Lei Feng, appears briefly in section 33 without any supplementary 
explanation of the text. Lei is graphically presented as a kind young man 
helping an old lady cross the street. His revolutionary spirit and commitment 
to Mao and the CCP are not mentioned.
Remonstrance/democracy
Unlike the popular interpretation of Confucian values as advocator of 
submission to authority, the New Classic understands the relationship between 
superior and subordinate roles as reciprocal. When a ruler in government and 
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parents in family make errors, ministers and children respectively should 
correct them. In section 12 it is stated: “When parents commit error, you should 
correct (jian) them with sincere attitude and soft language”. The “human 
mirror”, Wei Zheng, is praised in section 50, as Wei was a minister in the Tang 
Dynasty who dared to annoy the emperor by initiating more than 200 attempts 
of remonstrance. There is no direct discussion of democracy in the book and 
only when the book praises the founder of the republic Sun Yat-sen in section 
60, he is named as the pioneer in advocating democracy and overthrowing the 
empire.
Private Morality
Self-cultivation (diligence, honesty, physical health, frugality)
The story of Su Qin, who stabbed himself in order to keep awake and keep 
studying at night, appears in section 19. In section 25, an old lady showed the 
importance of endurance to the young poet Li Bai by making a needle from a 
huge medal bar. Section 26 tells us of poor kids who, though lacking candles, 
collected light-buds or relied on reflection of moonbeams on snow to light up 
their rooms for study at night. Section 40 and 41 warn that crimes and vices 
are originated from greed, and an honest official in Han Dynasty is praised 
for persistently refusing bribes from others. Historian Si Maqian is praised in 
section 72 for his honesty in recording history. In his book, he did not conceal 
the emperor’s vices nor did he flatter the people in power. In section 42 it is 
concluded that frugality is the key to success, and conspicuous consumption 
the path to a country’s or family’s ruin.
Interpersonal relationship (deference, benevolence, friendship)
The most famous story of deferencetells us in section 8 of Kong Rong 
picking the smallest pear to let his elder brothers have the larger ones. Phrases 
such as “China is a country respecting rites (li yi)”, “respect your teachers, 
respect the seniors”, “abide by laws in society and follow the rules in school” are 
repeatedly stated in sections 6, 23, 29, 43, 44 and 46. The famous Confucius’s 
golden rules are documented in section 38: “If you don’t think it is good, don’t 
do it unto others”, and “if you desire to achieve something, you should also 
let others to achieve it too”. The legend of Si Maguang saving a kid who was 
drowning is praised as an act of benevolence and bravery in section 39. In 
section 73, Di Pu is named “sage of poem”, as his poems are full of empathy 
with human sufferings. Concerning friendship, sections 35 and 36 use the 
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relationship between Guan and Bao as an example to illustrate that sincerity 
and humbleness are basic principles of friendship. One should be lenient to 
others but austere to oneself. One should also be picky in choosing friends 
and be trustful (dao yi) to others. The following rule by Confucius is quoted in 
section 37: “Whenever a few persons walk together, there comes my teacher. 
When I see a virtuous person, I think about learning from him”.
Family values (family education, filial piety)
In the first few sections, the New Classic declares that human nature is 
like an unpolished jade, that human feelings (qing) and man’s ontologically 
ultimate nature (xing) can be shaped by moral education (see also Metzger 
1977:31). Moral education is most important among other kinds of education, 
whileresponsibility for moral teaching rests upon the parents. The famous 
stories of Meng Ke’s mother, who moved three times to find a decent 
neighborhood for him and cut a cloth under knitting to show the importance of 
endurance, appears in section 3. Section 4 records another famous story, that of 
Yue Fei’s mother, who tattooed “loyalty to country” in his back before he went 
to battlefield. It this story, private morality (filial piety) and public morality 
(loyalty) are united. The model of filial piety, Huang Xiang of the Han Dynasty, 
is promoted in section 7 for her thoughtfulness in warming her father’s bed 
before letting his father sleep in winter. To be practical, readers of the New 
Classic are encouraged in section 13 to share household chores as a way to 
show their love to their families. Finally, the motto “My family loves me and 
I love my family. Extending the same feeling, I love my country” appears in 
section 14 as a typical Confucian way of constituting public morality through 
family values. 
Summing up, there are several characteristics of the New Three-Word 
Classic:
1) It promotes Confucianism. The book adopted many traditional Chinese 
stories and proverbs that were used in the past as an expression of Confucian 
values. Confucius and Mencius were introduced in section 68 as founders 
of Confucianism. Confucianism was depicted as a school which emphasizes 
education and promotes benevolence (ren) and righteousness (yi). This was 
exactly the theme of the New Classic.
2) It avoids socialist ideology. Not a single section mentioned socialism 
or communism. Mao was introduced in section 62 and 63 no more than as a 
historical figure who led the 1949 revolution and the war against Japan. Former 
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President Liu Shao-qi was promoted in section 30 not because of his political 
belief, but of his moral virtues. Lei Feng, the icon of socialist morality, who 
ignored personal and familial interests and sacrifice himself for the well-being 
of the collectivity, was only briefly introduced without further elaboration of 
his political commitment.
3) It poses a dilemma. The original goal of the book was to provide 
practical moral guidelines to young people by avoiding high-sounding, 
orthodox ideals. While the book did avoid socialist morality and reiterated the 
importance of self-cultivation, proper interpersonal relationship, and family 
values, promotion of patriotism still took up a major portion of the book. This 
could be an outcome of political compromise between the writers and the party 
officials, as nationalism was an ideology accepted by both socialists and liberals 
in modern China. As a result, careful readers would find an unbridgeable gap 
between this nationalistic sentiment and private moral concerns. It is unclear 
how this heavy dose of patriotism can make one a virtuous person particularly 
when there is rampant corruption in the state. Can political leaders serve as 
moral authority to the people as prescribed by the Confucian ideal? Today, 
is it patriotic or virtuous to cooperate with other citizens in fighting against 
corruption or pollution? Should they trust strangers when there is a large 
influx of migrants from villages to cities who have become second class 
citizens and a potential threat to law and order? Presumably in order to avoid 
political troubles, only a few sections of the book were devoted to civic virtues 
concerning proper behavior (like environmental protection) in the public arena 
between family and state. As shown in Table 2, more sections of the book are 
devoted to nurturing readers’ patriotism or family loyalty. This is consistent 
with the dominant Confucian tradition that “the conceptual continuum moves 
directly from family to state, without any infrastructure in-between, and even 
the state is thought of, in ritual terms, as the family writ large” (De Bary 1998: 
37). But this created a problem in the public life of the Chinese people when 
their devotion was absorbed completely by family obligations. In rectifying 
this family-absorbing tendency, extreme actions were taken during the Cultural 
Revolution to eradicate personal and familial interest. The tragic result of 
this turbulence ironically led to further demoralization in the society. How to 
reconstitute personal morality and find a new cultural base for public morality 
in the contemporary context is a pressing issue in China today not duly resolved 
by the publication of the New Classic.
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Conclusion
The publication of the New Three-Word Classic reflected that CCP had 
recognized a moral crisis in Chinese society, which led the Party branch in 
Guangdong (the region considered the frontier of reform) to encourage the 
adoption of Confucianism as a value system in order to rebuild the social moral 
tissue. Although brief (probably due to the implied challenge to the official 
ideology it posed), the experiment revealed the existence of a moral vacuum 
and the potential for resurrecting traditional Chinese values.
The logic of Confucian thinking is first develop personal virtues through 
fulfilling family obligations and then elevate this loyalty from family to the 
country. The publication of the New Classic, however, represented a political 
compromise between the concerned intellectuals and the party by putting 
priority on patriotism over private morality as shown in the number of sections 
devoted to teaching patriotism. It is not clear how the emphasis on patriotism 
can be instrumental in nurturing personal virtues or whether it is a solution to 
the moral questions in people’s mind.
Many studies have shown that there is a revival of family values in China 
after the reform, and even parents who live apart from their married children 
still tend to maintain very close contact. Multifaceted interdependence between 
households of parents and married children can be easily found in terms of 
interchange of gifts and money (Unger, 1993:26), and in times of need, lay-off 
workers can still seek support from their family members (Chan & Qiu 1999). 
In this regard, private morality has been reconstituted in tandem with the retreat 
of the state from society. On the contrary, people have a strong feeling of moral 
decay in the public domain. Public disorder caused by massive migration of rural 
population to the cities, pollution and toxic food produced by big companies, 
rampant corruption and abuse of power, fierce competition for educational, 
housing and medical resources have made people feel more insecure than ever. 
Parents are confused about the moral principles they should teach their children 
when dealing with people beyond their immediate circle. Should they offer 
help to strangers when the society is full of traps? Should they defer to others 
when opportunities are so limited? Is it wise to challenge an unjust situation? 
There is a feeling of uneasiness among the parents, so that, on the one hand, 
they are worried that the new generation has become more individualistic and 
materialistic; on the other hand, in order to protect their children from running 
into trouble in this corrupt society, they are hesitant to socialize their children 
into principled persons with mindfulness, courtesy, sense of justice and other 
civic virtues. After all, these parents are from the “lost generation” of the 
Cultural Revolution who were demoralized by political struggles. In view of 
this, neither the heavy dose of patriotism in the New Classic nor the traditional 
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Confucian teaching of private morality can help resolve this moral dilemma. 
Deep-rooted insecurity in public life must be addressed in order to rebuild the 
moral tissue in society.
This brings us back to the debate on “good society”. Bellah et al 
(1991) maintain that it is not purely a matter of “habits of the heart” such as 
individualism that causes so many problems in contemporary society. There 
is an institutional dimension of moral issue. Simply put, it is difficult to be a 
good person in the absence of a good society. In the case of China, the sense of 
insecurity is caused by the loss of community when people are liberated from 
state-controlled work units but not allowed to associate with each other through 
autonomous social organizations (Chan 2013). Social capital in terms of norm 
of reciprocity and trust is rich in social networks among friends and relatives 
but shallow in the community.
Apparently, Chinese today still value Confucian teachings such as filial 
piety, diligence and honesty, but they are inadequate to respond to their major 
concerns on public morality. The Confucian “leap of loyalty” from family to 
state undermines the development of public spiritedness and consequently an 
autonomous social sphere essential to nurture public morality through civic 
participation. If the “public” can be understood as a realm between state and 
society, it needs efforts both from state as well as from society to reconstitute 
public morality. Civil society or community is an institutional arrangement 
urgently needed in China for people to formulate a socially constitutive 
value system, to establish trust and to defend society against a corrupt state. 
Confucianism is either too family-oriented or too state-centered, so that 
it cannot provide a solid cultural foundation for establishing a vibrant civil 
society between families and state. To save China from moral predicament, 
further opening of the ideological arena is urgently in need.
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